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Reporter's Transcript taken October

2014 will

lodged

the Supreme Court.

Joim Exhibits:
I.

First Report of Injury

2.

Photographs

3.

Franklin County Ambulance

4.

Franklin County Medical Center

5.

Portneuf Medical Center Life Flight

6.

Karen D. Fryar, M.S. CCC-SLP

7.

Theresa Ross, Ph.D. - Reports dated 9/05/07 & 10/22/07

8.

Tom Millard's Deposition Transcript - 3/04/08

9.
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10.

Mark Passey, M.D.
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Robert M. Miska, M.D.
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13.

Richard T. Knoebel, M.D.
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Report dated 2/28/12
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21.

Pain Management Center (Dr. Garg)
Letter to Dan Bowen

10/04/12 - 8/26/ 14

5/?,5/12
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Carole Carr Deposition Transcript
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Depositions:
1.

David Beckstead, M.D., taken 12/09/14
Vikas Gard, M.D., MSA, taken 12/11/14

3.

Paul Collins, M.D., taken 1/15/15

Additional Documents:
1.

Claimant's Opening Brief, field March 19, 2015
Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, filed April 15, 2015

3.

Claimant's Reply Brief, filed April 29, 2015

EXHIBITS LIST (THOMAS

iv

P.O.

JUDICIAL

CLAIMANl"!S (INillRED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Thomas
1135 N.

Fredl Lewis
Racine, Olson,
Budge &
201 E. Center Center Street Plaza
P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

r,vc>lVll,

Millard
ID

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

435-757-5243

Chartered

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADillSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury)

ABCO Construction, Inc.
No Idaho Surety

Perry, UT 84302
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

CLAIMANT'S BIRTHDATE

STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED
Franklin County, State ofldaho

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
October 9, 2006

WHEN INmRED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
OF:$ 18.00/hr
, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INWRY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED)

Claimant fell off from decking approximately 25 feet to a concrete floor.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Head injury, tom rotator cuff, broken ribs, crushed vertebrae, broken collar bone, fluid in right lung, numbness in arms and hands.
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT TIDS TIME?

Future Medical Benefits, TTD benefits, PPI benefits, PPD benefits, Total and Permanent Disability benefits, and Attorney Fees and penalty
pursuant to Industrial Commission.
DATE OF WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO
EMPLOYER
10/9/2006(0ral Notice)

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN
Tyler

181 ORAL

181 WRITTEN

D OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED
Entitlement to Future Medical benefits
Entitlement to TTD benefits
Entitlement to PPI benefits
Entitlement to PPD benefits
Entitlement to Total and Permanent Disability benefits
Entitlement to Attorney Fees and penalty pursuant to Industrial Commission

.'

l

4

;>

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATEITSET
OFF
ACTS? DYES
U1
CJ
NO IS SO, PLEASE STATE WHY
"

l:8l

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
IDAHO CODE§ 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002

IClOOl

1/01/2004)

OTHER

l of3

A.ND ADDRESS)
Dr. Melville,
Dr. Hickey,

Odgen, Utah, Ne11ros.urgeon
Idaho

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS
IF ANY? $Unknown

Utah

WHAT MEDICAL

EMPLOYER

HAVE YOU

NO

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IE.#'fflE OTHER PARTIES
/

DATE

.

/',-----,1--,1-.........,

SIG

r'

__

v>"~

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF ~lE~TIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS Mi\DE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF
PARTY FILING COMPLAINT

DATE OF DEATH

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?

DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?

DYEs

DYEs

DNo

DNo

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e + day ofMarch, 2007, I caused to be served a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing Complaint upon:
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

ABCO Construction, Inc.
1834 S. Hwy 89
Perry, UT 84302

via:

D personal service of process
X

Certified U.S. Mail

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form I.C.
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of
mailing to avoid default. If no answer is filed, Default Award may be entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000.

(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)

Complaint - Page 2 of 3

(Provider Use Only)
Medical Record

DPickup
D Mail Copies
ID Confirmed
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INF0Rl'1ATI0N
I hereby a u t h o r i z e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - to disclose health information as specified:

Provider Name - must be specific for each provider
To:

-------------------------------------

Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/ Self Insured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney
Street Address
City

State

Code

Purpose of need for
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:

D
D

History & Physical Exam

D
D

Operative Reports

D
D

Pathology

D
D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Discharge Summary
Consultation Reports
Lab
Radiology Reports
Entire Record
Other:

I understand that the disclosure ay include information relating to (check if applicable):

D

AIDS or HIV

D

Psychiatric or Mental Health Information

D

Drug /Alcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CPR Part 164) and that
the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand
that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization
won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition
treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this
authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service
contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the
extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release
of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer
of the Provider specified above.

Signature of Witness
Original: Medical Record

Date
Copy: Patient

Complaint - Page 3 of 3

To: Industrial Con1111Ission, Ju<liGiai Division, 317 iviain Street, PO BOX 83720, Boise, Idaho 83}20-0041

JC !003 (Rev. 1/01/2004)

ANSWER

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME A'ND ADDRESS

THOMAS C. MILLARD
1135 N. FAIRWAY
PRESTON, ID 83263

FRED J. LEWIS, ESQ.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
20 I E. CENTER CENTER STREET PLAZA
t'UJ::SUX U~!

TELEPHONE: (435) 757-5243

POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
1834 S. HWY 89
PERRY, UT 84302

WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
C/0 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES
POBOX6768
BOISE, ID 83707

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(NAME AND ADDRESS)

R. DANIEL BOWEN (JSB #2673)
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P.
350 NORTH NINTH STREET, STE. 200
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

"'

"

'"

l

·~·

IT IS: (Check one)
Admitted

Denied
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually;m:curred Ql:J:"Of about the time
claimed.
~
r,:

X

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.
X
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
X
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly

X

entirely

NIA

NIA

D

by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade,
occupation, process, or employment.

X

6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such
occupational disease.

X

7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho Code,
Section 72-419: $_ _ __

X
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

9.

What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?.
CONTINUING BENEFITS COMENSURATE WITH CLAIMANT'S RECOVERY.

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Answer-Page

'

front)

l 0.

L

with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH CLAIMANT IS TEMPORARILY DISABLED.
OF CLAIMANT'S PERMANENT DISABILITY.

III.

WHETHER APPORTIONMENT AS TO BENEFITS CLAIMED IS APPROPRAITE BASED UPON PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS.

IV.

WHETHER AI"L OF CLAIMANT'S PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AILMENTS ARE DUE TO THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY.

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A
copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular US. mail or by personal service of process.
Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule UI(D), Judicial Rules
of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form J.C.
1002.

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

YES

NOX

DO YOU BELIEVE THJS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.

NO.

Amount of Compensation oaid to date
PPD

TTD
UNDER

Dated

Medical

INVESTIG

AT ION

/1,, /67

I/

P"~~:JB.
j

t>.'1/

R. DANIEL BOwy (ISB #2673)

PLEASE COMPLETE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~~ y of November, 2007, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

FRED J. LEWIS, ESQ.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY
PO BOX 1391
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391
FAX: (208) 232-6109
via

personal service of process
regular US. mail
facsimile

c~ ,

<--.._

V.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Employer,
and
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the
above-entitled matter to Referee Brian Harper, who conducted a hearing in Pocatello,
Idaho, on October 24, 2014. Claimant was represented by James D. Ruchti, of Pocatello.
R. Daniel Bowen, of Boise, represented Employer and Surety.

Oral and documentary

evidence was admitted. Post-hearing depositions were taken and the parties submitted briefs.
The matter came under advisement on May 5, 2015.
ISSUES

The issues at the time of hearing included:
1.

Whether Defendants paid all medical benefits and corresponding travel

expenses to which Claimant is entitled for disputed physical therapy and past spinal steroid
injection treatments.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

AND RECOMMENDATION 1

to
treatment

treatments
§

3.

Whether, and to what extent, payment of Claimant's past medical bills are

subject to the Neel Doctrine.
4.

Whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under

Idaho Code § 72-804.
By the time the matter came under advisement, Surety had paid all remaining physical
therapy bills at the fee schedule rate; it remains an issue whether such bills should be paid at full
invoiced price.

Mileage for such treatment has been paid.

Dr. Garg's treatments between

October 2012 and October 2013 remain contested.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Claimant, a totally and permanently disabled individual, previously settled his
worker's compensation claim against Defendants, but the agreement left open continuing
medical care and related charges.

Currently, there is an issue of compensability for

previous epidural steroid injections (ESI) 1 given between October 2012, and October 2013.
This claim includes travel expenses associated with these injections.
Claimant also seeks attorney fees for Surety's unreasonable delays in paying for
certain physical therapy treatments and related travel expenses, as well as for delays in
paying for prescription drugs. Lastly, Claimant argues he is entitled to reimbursement of
all medical expenses at issue at full invoice rates, pursuant to the Neel Doctrine.

1

The treating doctor distinguished between what he tenned an epidural steroid injection (ESI), and a transforaminal
epidural injection (TFE) based on the exact location of the injection relative to the mid point of the disc. When the
tenn ESI is used herein, it describes any epidural spinal injection, including ESI and TFE.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2

1

treatments are not
not

owe

fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. They argue Neel is inapplicable to the current facts.

EVIDENCE CONSIDERED
The record in this matter consists of the following:
L

Claimant's testimony, taken at hearing;

2.

The hearing testimony of witnesses Janet Harris, Trudi Beck, and

Carole Carr;
3.
Exhibits

Joint Exhibits (JE) 1through 59, (which includes Defendants' Additional
55

through

59),

admitted

at

hearing;

and

as

detailed

below,

Claimant's Exhibits (CE) 60, 61, and 62;
4.

The post-hearing deposition transcript of David Beckstead, M.D., taken on

December 9, 2014;
5.

The post-hearing deposition transcript of Vikas Garg, M.D., taken on

December 11, 2014; and
6.

The post-hearing deposition transcript of Paul Collins, M.D., taken on

January 15, 2015.
All pending objections to questions or testimony, preserved during post-hearing
depositions, are overruled. Defendants objected to the introduction of Claimant's proposed
Exhibits 60 through 62, proffered during Dr. Garg's deposition. The objection is overruled
and Claimant's Exhibits 60, 61, and 62 are admitted.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Claimant, a resident of Preston, Idaho, was rendered totally and permanently

disabled as the result of an industrial accident in October 2006, while working for
Employer, a Utah construction firm. His injuries left him with constant back and left lower
extremity pain to varying degrees of severity, neck and shoulder pain, and a traumatic brain
injury. His bodily injuries left him limited in his daily activities. His brain injury affected
his cognition, emotions, attention and memory, and social skills, including angermanagement issues.
2.

Surety Workers Compensation Fund of Utah originally handled Claimant's

case as a Utah claim. After the case entered litigation, Surety eventually transferred it to
third-party administer Pinnacle Risk Management Services in Boise, which has handled the
claim thereafter to the present. Pinnacle and its adjuster are also listed herein as "Surety".
3.

Claimant settled his litigation with a lump sum agreement. The settlement

agreement left his medical charges "open." The "open meds" provision is at the root of
this dispute. More particularly, the dispute herein at its core springs from the workings of
Idaho Code § 72-432.
4.

Claimant lives some distance from most of his medical providers. Originaily he

primarily treated with a physician in the Salt Lake City area; more recently he sought care from
doctors in Logan, Utah, and his local physician for medication management.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 4

an
care and treatment as

an
required

employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury, and for a reasonable time thereafter.
If the employer fails to provide such care and treatment, the injured employee may obtain such at

the expense of the employer. However, a claimant is not allowed to seek medical care on his
own unless the employer fails to provide the same. Should a claimant wish to seek care from a
physician other than the one(s) provided by an employer, Idaho Code § 72-432(4) provides a
procedure for a claimant to seek such change of physician. Idaho Code § 72-432(5) makes it
clear that if a claimant seeks care apart from the physician(s) provided by the employer, and
without authorization of employer or its surety, or order of the Commission, claimant shall not
be reimbursed for the cost of such care.
Dr. Garg's Treatment from October 2012 to October 2013

6.

From October 2012 until October 2013, Claimant sought care from Vikas

Garg, M.D. of Logan, Utah without prior authorization of Surety.

Thereafter, Surety

authorized continuing treatment with Dr. Garg. 2 Defendants' position is clear and straight
forward - Dr. Garg was not an authorized treater during the 2012 - 2013 time frame, and
thus under Idaho Code § 72-432(5), such treatment is not reimbursable. Claimant argues that
Surety's failure to provide reasonable treatment, or even respond in a meaningful way to
Claimant's request for change of physician, ailowed him to seek treatment with Dr. Garg at
Surety's expense.
2

Dr. Garg's last treatment during the time contested was in October 2013. However, from the exhibits provided, it
appears Dr. Garg was not approved as a provider until November 2013. This fact is not important for the ruling
herein, but Defendants at several places in their briefing state that Dr. Garg was approved by Surety in mid-October
2013, which does not appear to be accurate.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 5

as

as

with a physician who will perform a comprehensive evaluation of

settlement, to
his condition." JE

897. In that same letter, Claimant reiterated that he "is not asking for

additional diagnostic tests or other studies," he simply wanted "an appropriate physician to
review those tests and studies, review the appropriate medical records, perform a physical
examination on him, and give [Claimant] an opportunity to discuss his physical/medical
complaints." Id. Later in that settlement proposal letter, Claimant noted that once this doctor
prepared his report on the comprehensive exam, the parties could "decide where to go
from there" to meet Claimant's future medical needs. Id at 898. This May 25 letter suggested
an examination more in line with an IME than a change of physician. However, Claimant did
make it clear in this and subsequent letters that he was dissatisfied and had lost confidence in his
Surety-appointed treating physician.
8.

Again on May 30, 2012, Claimant sent Defendants a letter regarding the

proposed examination. It simply changed recommended doctors from the previously suggested
physician in Pocatello to one in Logan, Utah.

This could not be construed as a change of

physician request.
9.

In a letter dated June 4, 2012, designated as a follow up to tie up loose ends,

Claimant listed several enumerated "loose ends" to settlement which needed addressing. Item 2
stated "[p]lease let me know whether the surety agrees to allow Dr. Michael Clegg ... to perform
a

comprehensive

moving forward."

FINDINGS

medical

evaluation ... and

JE 24, p. 901.

to

provide

ongomg

medical

treatment

This 1s the first instance where Claimant sought

FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 6

10.

a request

change of

in June 2012 which mention medical treatment moving forward, when taken in the context of the
settlement negotiations and the letter of May 25, 2012, contemplate nothing more than a
potential for future care depending on the outcome of the comprehensive exam.
11.

Trudi Beck, an employee of Claimant's counsel, testified that she spoke with

Pinnacle adjuster Carole Carr on August 1, 2012 regarding a request for change of physician.
Surety appeared to deny the request during the conversation, and informed Ms. Beck a decision
letter from Surety's counsel would be forthcoming. No letter was sent.
12.

In a letter dated December 21, 2012, Claimant clearly and directly requested a

change of physician from the current treater to either Dr. Garg or a Dr. Clegg, both of whom
practiced in Logan, Utah, which was considerably closer to Claimant's Preston, ID residence
than his then-treating physician, who was located in the Salt Lake City area.
13.

Claimant's written request for change of physician was denied four and a half

months later, on May 2, 2013.
14.

On June 25, 2013, Claimant filed a Petition for Change of Venue, asking for

Dr. Clegg to assume the role as Claimant's treating physician. Surety agreed to allow the change
in its Response to Petition.
15.

Claimant was turned away when he attempted to see Dr. Clegg. The doctor

would not treat him due to the fact Claimant was represented by an attorney.
16.

On August 8, 2013, Claimant asked Surety to substitute Dr. Garg for Dr. Clegg.

On September 11, 2013, Claimant again asked for Surety approval to see Dr.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 7

17.

On September

201

Surety responded that it just recently spoken with, and
to

treatment

steroid

a
to

Garg also had expressed an idea that perhaps a spinal stimulator could assist Claimant
Surety was reluctant to authorize Dr. Garg if he intended to treat Claimant with the implanted
stimulator, as Surety was concerned over the stimulator expense and a perceived low to nonexistent success rate. Surety suggested a different physician to treat Claimant.
18.

As noted, Claimant had been seeing Dr. Garg since October 2012. Claimant had

been going to the VA for care since he lost confidence in his treating doctor. He was referred to
Dr. Garg from the VA on a voucher when the VA doctor was unavailable.

Dr. Garg had been

billing the VA and Medicare. Dr. Garg had not been sending Surety written medical reports for
each treatment session, contrary to IDAPA 17.02.04.322.02(a).

He had not billed Surety

for his services.
19.

When Surety rejected Dr. Garg, Claimant filed another Petition for Change of

Physician on October 30, 2013.
20.

On November 11, 2013, Surety suggested a compromise, in part based on a

telephone conversation its counsel had with Dr. Garg. Claimant would retain a "treating" doctor
to manage prescription medications, and Dr. Garg would perform steroid injections every three
to four months.

Claimant did not want to undergo the psychological testing needed for a

stimulator implant, so that procedure was taken off the table. Apparently, Dr. Garg informed
Surety the injections would run in the neighborhood of $800 per injection, which Surety took to
mean per session or office visit.
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21,

13,

1

not

physician, while knowing Claimant had not been seeing his Surety-approved treating physician
2011. Claimant relies on Idaho Code § 72-432(1), which provides that a claimant can
independently obtain medical services at the expense of employer when employer fails to
provide

the

same.

Claimant

supports

this

argument

with

the

holding

m

Overall v. Walgreen, 2007 IC 0245, April 24, 2007.
23.

Defendants counter with the fact it did not know Dr. Garg was treating Claimant

during this time frame, as the doctor did not send his reports or billings to Surety. Dr. Garg was
not authorized to treat Claimant. Treatments obtained by Claimant without Surety's knowledge
or

authority

are

not

compensable.

Marshall v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 1990

IC

0190,

Defendants
March

15,

1990,

rely
to

on
bolster

their argument.
24.

Neither case cited by the parties is controlling. The cited comments in Overall

were made in the context of an attorney fee claim, and the question was whether the surety was
reasonable in delaying payment for medical charges. The bills had been paid by the time of
hearing. In Marshall the Claimant chose to see her chiropractor while continuing treatment with
the surety-authorized physician. Claimant Marshall never mentioned such treatment, and did not
seek a change of physician. Her chiropractor compounded the problem by failing to submit
records and bills to the surety. In the present case, Claimant had ceased treatment with his thentreating physician long before beginning treatment with Dr. Garg.

Claimant, through his

attorney, had made it known he had lost confidence in his treater. While Dr. Garg's name
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3,

not

someone

After Surety discovered Claimant had gone to Dr. Garg for treatment, had
obtained his billings, and had the chance to review the nature of his past treatment, namely
steroid injections, it had the after-the-fact opportunity to meet its obligation to pay Claimant's
previous,

but

reasonably-incurred

medical

expenses.

See,

e.g.,

Seward

v.

Pacffic Hide & Fur Depot, et al, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P.3d 531, 534 (2003). The fact Surety

subsequently authorized the same treatment previously rendered by Dr. Garg, (ESI), is an
indication Surety, at least at that time, felt the treatment was not umeasonable.
26.

Claimant had a right to obtain medical treatment, and the weight of the evidence

supports the proposition that Surety hampered his ability to get such treatment by delaying
decisions on change of physician, while aware of the fact Claimant needed on-going medical
treatment which was not being provided by Surety's approved physician.
27.

Certainly, it would have been better if Dr. Garg had provided billing and reports

to Surety in a timely fashion. It would have helped if Claimant had informed his counsel he was
seeing Dr. Garg. Claimant complicated the issue when he utilized his VA benefits and Medicare
to pay for treatment related to this industrial accident. However, none of those things exonerate
Surety from performing its obligation under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) in the unique circumstances
of this case.
28.

Surety is obligated to pay for Dr. Garg's treatment from October 2012 through

the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
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13.
Continuing Epidural Steroid Iniections

30.

In November 2013, Surety approved a change of physician to Dr. Garg with

the understanding he would continue to provide ESI on a periodic basis for an unspecified
period of time into the future. This decision was based in large part on representations
made by Dr. Garg regarding the cost and efficacy of the injections.

Defendants now

question the reasonableness of continued injections.
31.

During his deposition on December 11, 2014, Dr. Garg testified to

twelve ESI treatments he had performed on Claimant.

The pain relief obtained by

the injections, according to Claimant's purely subjective representations as noted in
the doctor's medical records, ranged from zero to seventy percent, and the duration
of substantial pain relief ranged from none to two months.
32.

Defendants argue against ESI as a continuing treatment modality for

the following reasons;
•

The cost, which ranges from $2200 to $4500 per treatment
session, is unreasonable given the uncertain, incomplete, and
temporary benefits;

•

Risks associated with the injections, including infection,
bleeding, nerve damage, spinal cord damage, and even
paralysis or coma, outweigh the benefits;

•

Lack of scientific study on efficacy of ESI as a long term pain
relief regimen;

•

Benefit of treatment is totally subjective, and how Claimant
feels on any given day is affected by other factors, including
the weather; perceived benefits might not even be from ESI;
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recent case

c7

V.

I,

l

Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the rule of Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc.,
116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989), that it is for the physician, not the Commission,
to decide whether a particular treatment is "required".

The only review the Commission

is entitled to make of the physician's decision is whether that treatment was "reasonable".
However, in Chavez, the Court made it clear that the so-called three-factor test of reasonableness
referenced in Sprague, should not be universally applied, and to that extent, overruled Sprague.

Chavez establishes that the reasonableness of the medical care required by the claimant's
physician is a question of fact to be supported by substantial and competent evidence. The
Commission's review of the reasonableness of medical treatment should employ a totality of the
circumstances approach.
34.

Based on the peculiar facts of this case, the following considerations are relevant

to determining whether the care required by Dr. Garg is "reasonable".

Cost/Benefit Ratio
35.

Dr. Garg's ESI sessions are expensive.

On a subjective basis, they often,

but not always, provide significant, albeit transient, pain relief. While cost alone can not
dictate whether a certain treatment is reasonable, it can be a factor in making that
determination. However, the cost must be juxtaposed against the benefits provided. A
costly treatment which provides only minimal benefits could be unreasonable, whereas as
an equally costly treatment which provides substantial benefits may well be reasonable.
Spending thousands for very little benefit is a form of economic waste. Economic waste is

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -

36.

Dove-tailing

into

the

cost/benefit

analysis

is

how

inconsistently the proposed treatment provides the desired benefit.

consistently

or

If an expensive

palliative treatment is undertaken, it should provide the desired benefit on a consistent
basis. For ESI, Dr. Garg testified the target goal is 50% pain reduction. He later revised
his expectations down to 30% pain reduction, but that figure seems low given the costs and
risks involved.

For the purpose of determining reasonableness, Dr. Garg's 50% pain

reduction figure is more appropriate. Using that criteria, Claimant hit the target benefit
two or three times in twelve sessions, although he came close, at 40% pain reduction, one
or two other times. 3 Using the more relaxed 30% pain reduction goal, Claimant still met
that mark less than half the time. 4 The variability of benefits is substantial.

Frequency o(Treatment
37.

The frequency of the proposed treatment is another subset of the cost/benefit

analysis which must be considered. After all, a one-time expense to "cure" a condition is
much more likely to be considered reasonable, even if very expensive, than an expensive
repetitious treatment designed to maintain the status quo.

In the present case, the ESI

treatment is palliative in nature. Palliative care can be compensable, if reasonable, and
Defendants do not suggest Claimant is not entitled to reasonable paliiative care. Given the
frequency of the ESI treatments ( every 2 to 3 months), coupled with their costs and
3

The equivocating stems from the fact Dr. Garg listed one injection session as producing 40 to 50 percent
pain reduction.
4
These figures are based upon Dr. Garg's testimony; interestingly there is an entry in the acupuncturist's
records dated May 24, 2013 which states that out of six ESI treatments from Dr. Garg, only one time did
Claimant feel any better (JE 55, p. 7).
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treatment

extent

38.

set

While Claimant, when asked at hearing about how the ESI helped him,

focused on the fact he had less pain for up to two months or more, Dr. Garg's records
indicate Claimant could walk better, had less morning pain, and a better appetite when the
ESI was working. It appears Claimant did experience increased functionality for up to two
months as a result of the treatments.

Ob;ective Validation
39.

One way to determine the effectiveness of a treatment, and thus assist in

determining its usefulness, is by objectively validating the results.

Purely subjective

responses to treatment are by nature less reliable, and more subject to a wide variety of
factors. As noted in this case, Claimant's pain waxes and wanes, sometimes independently
of treatment, and can be affected by such things as the weather. Dr. Garg agreed that at
least some of Claimant's subjective reports of decreased pain levels post-treatments could
be related to factors other than the injections. Lack of an objective way to measure the
effectiveness of ESI treatments is a consideration, but Claimant's subjective claims must
not be dismissed or discounted simply because his claims can not be objectively confirmed.

Alternative Treatment
40.

Claimant testified that in addition to ESI treatments and a pain medication

regimen, he obtained relief from chiropractic treatment, acupuncture, and physical therapy
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5

41.

While Claimant testified to effective treatment alternatives to ESI, no attempt

was made to quantify the effectiveness of chiropractic care, acupuncture, and physical
therapy. Claimant testified he attends acupuncture sessions every two weeks. He did not
testify to his current chiropractic schedule. The question is whether some combination of
these treatments can provide an acceptable level of pain reduction even without the
periodic injections. Currently that is an unanswered question.

Treatment Acceptance
42.

Experimental or unorthodox treatments are less likely viewed as reasonable

compared to those which are generally accepted within the medical community.

While

epidural steroid injections are accepted as an alternative to back surgery (when successful),
Defendants' expert, Paul Collins, M.D. 6 testified the use of EPI as a continuing form of
palliative pain management is not supported by scientific evidence or studies. Even Dr.
Garg admitted his use of the steroid Kenelog is contrary to the drug manufacturer's
warnings. He did believe the use was permitted by the FDA, based on the fact Medicare
paid for the procedures. The three medical journal articles submitted by Dr. Garg were in
5

Claimant has been paying for acupuncture himself, and Medicare pays for his chiropractic visits.
Unfortunately, the therapist currently does not treat Claimant.
6
Claimant objects to consideration of Dr. Collins' opinions, in part due to his belief that the doctor has a conflict of
interest in this matter. This concern stems from Dr. Collins' deposition testimony which could be read to suggest
he is a "consultant" for the Commission on the issue of ESI. Such is not his role. He is a member of the Industrial
Commission's Advisory Committee, along with worker's compensation attorneys from both sides, insurance
representatives, labor representatives, medical people, and others, who meet periodically to discuss, debate and give
suggestions on a wide range of topics germane to the worker's compensation system and statutes. \Vhile their work
is important, they do not hold any exalted status with the Commission, and in fact many are attorneys who handle
workers' compensation cases on a daily basis with the Commission. Dr. Collins holds no special sway with the
Commission because of his participation on the Advisory Committee. His testimony does not present any type of
conflict of interest.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -15

to

as
treatment.

to
further suspicion that his treatment is not widely accepted in the medical community.
When accepted treatment options exist, the use of experimental or "off label" treatment is
more difficult to justify as being reasonable.

Treatment Risks
43.

The risk of harm must be considered when determining if a given treatment

option is reasonable. While one might argue that if the risk is acceptable to the patient and
the provider, a surety or the Commission has no right to consider that risk in their decision
making. However, risk is a very important consideration, since the party who bears the
financial burden of treatment going wrong and leading to increased physical harm is the
surety who will have to pay the medical costs of such harm.

In determining

reasonableness, the risk/benefit ratio may be even more important than the cost/benefit
ratio. As risk of serious harm increases, the reasonableness of the treatment decreases.
Some procedures are just too risky to be reasonable for anything but life-saving benefit.
As the anticipated benefit decreases, the risk of the procedure becomes more of a
consideration. A high risk, low benefit procedure is unlikely to be reasonable.
44.

ESI contains very real, and potentially very serious risks. Those risks were

acknowledged by Dr. Garg, although he seemed to brush off the chance of an adverse risk
occurring. Dr. Collins, on the other hand, feels the risks clearly outweigh the benefits of
ESL

Dr. Collins testified that he had reviewed data for 153 ESI patients and found

approximately ten percent of them had some adverse affects, up to and including one case
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it

a

are
45.

confirm that

the procedure, and can happen.
Claimant is content with the risk level, in large part due to the fact his pain

can be severe and unrelenting. As his pain increases, so does his willingness to endure the
risk to obtain relief.

That is very understandable.

Unfortunately, Claimant repeatedly

faces those risks each time he submits for treatment, and the more treatments he receives,
the greater the opportunity for complications. That fact must be weighed in the analysis.

Factor Analysis Conclusion
46.

Considering all of the above factors, and considering the totality of the

circumstances, on balance the evidence weighs against continued quarterly ESI treatments.
Dr. Collins testified a standing order for quarterly ESI treatments into the indefinite future
was not reasonable; Dr. Garg testified to the contrary. More weight is given to Dr. Collins'
testimony on this issue, for the reasons stated above. A standing order for quarterly ESI
treatments into the indefinite future is not currently reasonable within the meaning of
Idaho Code§ 72-432(1).

Application of Neel to Payment o{Medical Costs
47.

Claimant urges that all medical costs, including prescriptions, which

remained unpaid until the matter was put at issue by the hearing notice, should be paid at
full invoice cost. In making this argument, Claimant acknowledges Surety has paid all
disputed prescription amounts (perhaps at full invoice), paid disputed physical therapy
charges (at fee schedule rate), and has not paid Dr. Garg' s charges for the disputed
time frame as discussed above.
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treatment

49.

I

1

The trigger for payment of medical bills at full invoice amount under the

Neel Doctrine (Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009)),

and IIC decisions discussing Neel, is a Commission determination that the unpaid bills at
issue are compensable after Defendants have denied the claim.

Here, while there were

several instances of "eleventh hour reversals" the fact remains when medical bills are paid
prior to a Commission decision of compensability, the Neel Doctrine is inapplicable. This
applies to the physical therapy charges, and prescriptions, which were paid prior to
this decision.
50.

Charges associated with Dr. Garg's treatments from October 2012 through

October 2013 are subject to Neel, and are subject to payment at full invoice price.
This includes hospital and physician charges.

Witness Credibility
51.

Claimant's testimony was predictably less than focused. It was sometimes

difficult to track when and whether he was describing an event which occurred before his
settlement, or thereafter. Many of his answers were not responsive to the question posed.
While there was never a time it appeared Claimant was fabricating an answer, nevertheless
his lack of focus made it difficult to know whether his testimony was accurate as to the
question asked, the relevant time frame in question, or the correct sequence of events.
As such, his testimony is afforded less weight than otherwise it might have been given.
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answers;
an

to
as

not

great love

concern for

her emotion

was understandable. Since much of it dealt with secondhand information from Claimant,
her testimony was subject to the accuracy of what she was told, coupled with a strong need
to have her say in the proceedings.

While the Referee is empathetic toward her plight,

her testimony is not afforded significant weight.
53.

Witness Trudi Beck was well prepared, largely unrebutted, and credible.

Her testimony will be highlighted in the next section.
54.

Witness Carole Carr likewise was forthright m her testimony, and her

testimony was credible.

Attorney Fees
55.

Claimant argues Surety's consistent pattern of delay, ignore, and dispute

warrants the application of attorney fees in this case. Claimant listed the exact amount of
fees sought based upon an hourly rate in his briefing.
56.

Defendants challenge the methodology Claimant's counsel used to calculate

attorney fees, and further argue Claimant is not entitled to fees, regardless of how they are
calculated. Defendants point out that most of the disputed medical charges have been paid,
and delays in those payments were due to Claimant's behavior, and that of his providers.
57.

Idaho Code§ 72-804 provides in relevant part:
If the commission . . . determines that the . . . surety contested a
claim for compensation made by an injured employee ... without
reasonable ground, or that ... surety neglected or refused within a
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to
pay to the injured employee ... the compensation provided by law,
or without reasonable grounds discontinued payment of
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compensation as provided
law justly
.. [surety] shall pay reasonable <:ittr,rn"'"
to the compensation provided by this
or
dependents shall be fixed by the commission.

The decision that grounds exist for awarding attorney fees is a factual determination which rests
with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525, 528, 547 P.2d 1130,
1133 (1976).
58.

While prescription payments were not an issue by the time of hearing,

Claimant provided testimony on the subject for the purpose of awarding attorney fees.
Trudi Beck's umebutted testimony was that it took one and a half years and seven letters
from Claimant's counsel to Surety to get unpaid prescription issues resolved.
59.

Certain unpaid physical therapy and corresponding mileage payments were at

issue at the time of hearing, although subsequently Surety paid these charges. While three
periods of physical therapy were contested at various times, it is the first block of twenty
four sessions, from August 31, 2011 through December 23, 2011, which provide the
most controversy. 7
60.

The visits in question were not paid until after the October 24, 2014 hearing

due to Surety's belief they were not authorized. This belief sprang in part from Surety's
failure to locate the prescription the treating physician wrote for the sessions. Carole Carr
testified she did not see the prescription until her September, 2014 deposition. She did
acknowledge, however, that Claimant's counsel sent her a copy of it no later than February,

7

The physical therapy visits from March 9, 2012 through May 8, 2012, and two visits in mid-December,
2012, in April, 2013, were paid prior to hearing and are not substantial in determining the attorney fee
question herein.
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1

a

wrote
Surety in August

1.

12 to discuss the unpaid therapy bills

and the fact Claimant had a prescription for the sessions. She suggested Surety check with
the treater to confirm the prescription. In October, 201

the therapy office sent billings

and supporting documents to Surety for payment. Surety claimed it needed to speak with
its attorney before moving forward with the claim.

The provider continued to attempt

contact with Surety over the next six months; finally Surety denied the claim.
62.

On December 21, 2012, Trudi Beck sent Surety a letter and supporting

therapy documents, but, similar to the provider, received no response. 8 On August 9, 2013,
Claimant's counsel re-visited the outstanding therapy bills in a letter to Defendants'
attorney.

There was no response.

On February 21, 2014, Claimant's attorney sent

Defendants' counsel a document package and letter, which discussed outstanding therapy
bills, and supplied copies of related documents, including the prescription.

On

February 28, 2014, Defendants responded by stating they were unaware Claimant had been
receiving physical therapy during this time frame. More than eight months later, Surety
finally paid the physical therapy bills from late 201 L
63.

Claimant also seeks attorney fees for the denial of ESI treatments, as

discussed earlier.
64.

Numerous examples of Surety's delay in responding to requests, ignoring

requests, and "buck passing" were presented at hearing.

Surety's rebuttal was not

8

It is not clear if the documents provided by the physical therapy office in October and/or Trudi Beck in December,
2012 contained the prescription authorizing additional therapy treatment. However, given the other contacts
spanning a two-year time frame, this fact is not pivotal.
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to

to excuse

s

not

were sent to
adjuster

to

to the fact that the case was originally a Utah claim, and the Utah

Surety's computer system was not available to her, which made her job more difficult.
65.

At hearing, Trudi Beck provided a detailed time line of interaction between

the parties. Too often, that time line was expressed in periods of months, if not years, to
get a substantive, although often incorrect, response from Surety.
66.

The Referee was present at hearing to listen to and observe witnesses, has

examined the exhibits, and has considered the parties' briefing.

After this review and

consideration, it is his perception that this case adjusting can be characterized as one of
"passive negligence.

Repeatedly, Carol Carr's testimony was one of waiting for bills to

come to her, and paying them 9, which may be acceptable in a perfect case. Unfortunately,
this is a very far from the perfect case. The Claimant is brain damaged; he fails to act
consistently, patiently, and persistently. He has a low tolerance for "foot dragging." When
Surety delayed payments, he ran them through Medicare.

Like Pavlov's dog, he was

trained over time to go around Surety, to the point where he would turn to alternate
payment sources quickly, rather than persisting in insisting Surety make the payments.
Claimant behaves impulsively at times, which makes keeping up with his medical treatment
more difficult. However, that is no excuse to ignore or neglect his case. To the contrary,
such a person requires more diligence, more oversight, and more communication. Surety
instead failed to communicate, failed to be proactive, failed to inquire when things did not

9

She testified she is "not in the habit of chasing down bills that I don't know exist or reports that I don't know exist.
When we owe people money, they come to me." Tr. p. 197, IL 19-22.
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When addressing entitlement to attorney

Surety argues the attorney was

not officially "representing" Claimant during much of the dispute, and thus not entitled to
many of his claimed fees.

However, Surety then argues it could not effectively

communicate with Claimant because he was, for the time in question, represented by an
attorney.

Surety's excuse that its lack of communication was justified because this case

"was in litigation" is frustrating, to say the least.

Claimant's counsel is very

communicative.
68.

The adjuster admitted she did not keep meticulous records in this matter.

She kept track of the case by jotting Claimant's name on her calendar quarterly to jog her
memory to check his file. She acknowledged there was a time when she routinely kept log
notes manually, yet she did not do so in this case. She argued that because she could not
access the Utah computer system it made her job more difficult. On that note, it is hard not
to agree. This is a difficult case to keep on top of; the nearly 1400 of pages of exhibits for
this hearing alone attest to that. This matter has been ongoing since 2006. It has to be an
adjuster's nightmare. Although human nature is to avoid those things we like the least, that
behavior is counterproductive in dealing with this claim.

This is not a case where the

adjuster can sit back and wait for things to happen. Otherwise, the Surety may think, for
example, it has the prescription matter "taken care of' when in reality it does not. Surety's
misunderstandings and misbelief led to many of the problems in this case. Surety had a
chance to work with Claimant's counsel to promptly resolve issues as they came up, but
instead too often ignored his requests, phone calls, and correspondence.
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no

to

to

a

treatment, or arranging

proper medical care. While it is true it has made

payments recently, and cleared up most of the issues on terms favorable to Claimant, that
does not exonerate Surety from the workings of Idaho Code § 72-804. The standard for an
award of attorney fees therein is "unreasonable" denial or delay in payments to which Claimant
is entitled. This case is highlighted by unreasonable delay when it came to paying medical bills,
authorizing treatment, and considering care providers.
The below-cited language of Overall v. Walgreen, 2007 IC 0245, April 24, 2007,

70.

is appropriate for this case, and is adopted herein, with one exception, as noted below;
[W]here Defendants' unreasonableness in adjusting this claim was
so pervasive, Claimant should be awarded attorney fees fully,
without reduction for the brief flashes of reasonableness by
Defendants. Claimant was forced to take this matter to hearing by
Defendants' unreasonableness. Eleventh hour reversals of position
by Defendants do not eliminate, ameliorate, or mitigate prior
unreasonableness. *** Thus, Claimant should be awarded attorney
fees for his time and efforts in preparing and trying this matter to
the fullest extent allowed by Idaho Workers' Compensation Law.
2007 IIC 0245.8.
71.

Claimant has proven, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804, a right to attorney

fees for efforts connected with obtaining past benefits to which he was entitled, but which
were unreasonably denied or delayed; including;
•

Surety's unreasonable denial of treatment with Dr. Garg from October 2013
through October 2014;

•

Unreasonably delaying payment of Claimant's prescription drugs, physical
therapy treatments, and transportation charges;

•

Unreasonably delaying responding to or approving Claimant's change of
physician requests.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 24

is not
to

issue, and m this instance acted reasonably m seeking to be proactive m managing
the claim.
73.

Unless the parties can agree on an amount for reasonable attorney fees,

Claimant's counsel shall, within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of the Commission's
decision, file with the Commission a memorandum of attorney fees incurred in counsel's
representation of Claimant in connection with these benefits, and an affidavit in support
thereof, with appropriate elaboration on Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13,
684 P.2d 990 (1984). The memorandum shall be submitted for the purpose of assisting the
Commission in discharging its responsibility to determine reasonable attorney fees in this
matter. Within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the memorandum and affidavit thereof,
Defendants may file a memorandum in response to Claimant's memorandum.

If

Defendants object to the time expended or the hourly charge claimed, or any other
representation made by Claimant's counsel, the objection must be set forth with
particularity. Within seven (7) days after Defendants' counsel files the above-referenced
memorandum, Claimant's counsel may file a reply memorandum. The Commission, upon
receipt of the foregoing pleadings, will review the matter and issue an order determining
attorney fees.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -

to Idaho

L

§

for Dr. Garg's treatment from October 2012 through
the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
2.

Claimant has proven he is entitled to reimbursement at the full invoiced amount

of all medical charges, pursuant to Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., for Dr. Garg's treatment
from October 2012 through the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
3.

Claimant has proven, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-432(13), he is entitled to

mileage and associated travel expenses for Claimant's treatment with Dr. Garg from
October 2012 through the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
4.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to continuing quarterly epidural steroid

injections for the present time.
5.

Claimant has failed to prove that he is entitled to reimbursement for the

full invoiced amounts of his past prescription and physical therapy charges.
6.

Claimant has proven that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's unreasonable denial of treatment with Dr. Garg from
October 2013 through October 2014.
7.

Claimant has proven that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's unreasonable delay in approving his claim for
prescription drugs, transportation charges, physical therapy treatments, and change of
physician request.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 26

the Commission adopt such

recommends

and

conclusions as its own and issue an appropriate final order.
DATED this

15.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
of
, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUS
S OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
JAMES RUCHTI
275 S 5TH AVE STE 140
POCATELLO ID 83201

DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701

jsk

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION

Claimant,

IC 2007-008413
ORDER

V.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Employer,
and
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Surety,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-71 7, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record in the
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law,
to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review.

Each of the

undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
The Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves,
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Claimant has proven, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-432(1), he is entitled to

reimbursement of all medical charges for Dr. Garg's treatment from October 2012 through
the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.

ORDER-1

is entitled to
to
from October
3.

invoiced amount

V.

treatment

12 through the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
Claimant has proven, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-432(13), he is entitled to

mileage and associated travel expenses for Claimant's treatment with Dr. Garg from
October 2012 through the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013.
4.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to continuing quarterly epidural steroid

injections for the present time.
5.

Claimant has failed to prove that he is entitled to reimbursement for the

full invoiced amounts of his past prescription and physical therapy charges.
6.

Claimant has proven that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's unreasonable denial of treatment with Dr. Garg from
October 2013 through October 2014.
7.

Claimant has proven that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's unreasonable delay in approving his claim for
prescription drugs, transportation charges, physical therapy treatments, and change of
physician request.
8.

Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804.

Unless the parties can agree on an amount for reasonable attorney's fees, Claimant's counsel
shall, within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of the Commission's decision, file with the
Commission a memorandum of attorney fees incurred in counsel's representation of Claimant in
connection with these benefits, and an affidavit in support thereof. The memorandum shall be
submitted for the purpose of assisting the Commission in discharging its responsibility to

ORDER 2

costs

affidavit

matter.

V.

file a memorandum in response to Claimant's

memorandum. If Defendant objects to any representation made by Claimant, the objection must
be set forth with particularity. Within seven (7) days after Defendant's response, Claimant may
file a reply memorandum.

The Commission, upon receipt of the foregoing pleadings, will

review the matter and issue an order determining attorney fees and costs.
9.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to

all matters adjudicated.
DATED this

--"'""""'-IA""""""'"----'

2015.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ORDER-3

JAMES RUCHTI
275 S 5TH AVE STE 140
POCATELLO ID 83201

jsk

ORDER-4

DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701

13:48 p.m.
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Beck (!SB
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K
Oakley Building
1950
Clark Street, Suite 200
Pocatello, ID 83201
Telephone: (208) 478-5100
Facsimile:
(208) 232-5100
Emaii: james@idahoiaw.us
Attorneys for Claimant/Appellant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THOMAS C. MILLARD,
Claimant/Appellant,
vs.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Employer, and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Surety,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 07-008413

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

)
)
)
Defendants/Respondents.)
)

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; AND THEIR ATTORNEY,
R. DANIEL BOWEN OF BOWEN & BAILEY, P.O. BOX 1007, BOISE, IDAHO
83701-1007, EMAIL info@bowen-bailey.com, 208-344-7200; AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Appellant Thomas C. Millard appeals against the abovenamed Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation issued by Referee Brian Harper
AND Order issued by the Industrial Commission, both of which were filed on
August 21, 2015 in the above-entitled action by the Idaho Industrial
Commission.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Pnge I
(S:\1229-002 MHlardTiAppeal\Notice of Appeal.wpd)
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Building
1950 E. Clark Street, Suite 200
Pocatello, ID 83201
Telephone: (208) 4 78-5100
Facsimile:
(208) 232-5100
Email: james@idaholaw.us
Attorneys for Claimant/Appellant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THOMAS C. MILLARD,

)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 07-008413

vs.

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Employer, and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Surety,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Claimant/Appellant,

Defendants/Respondents.)
)

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; AND THEIR ATTORNEY,
R. DANIEL BOWEN OF BOWEN & BAILEY, P.O. BOX 1007, BOISE, IDAHO
83701-1007, EMAIL info@bowen-bailey.com, 208-344-7200; AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Appellant Thomas C. Millard appeals against the abovenamed Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation issued by Referee Brian Harper
AND Order issued by the Industrial Commission, both of which were filed on
August 21, 2015 in the above-entitled action by the Idaho Industrial
Commission.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1
(S:\1229-002 MillardT\Appeal\Notice of Appeal.wpd)

1 above,
interlocutory and final orders entered prior to and after the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation AND Order are appealable under
and pursuant to Rule 11 (d)(1 ), I.A.R.
A preiiminary statement of the issues on appeai which the Appeiiant intends
to assert on appeal includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not
prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal:
a.

The Industrial Commission erred by adopting as a conclusion of
law the following statement from Paragraph 49 of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation:
49.

The trigger for payment of medical bills at full
invoice amount under the Neel Doctrine (Neel v.
Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206
P.3d 852 (2009)), and IIC decisions discussing
Neel, is a Commission determination that the
unpaid bills at issue are compensable after
Defendants have denied the claim. Here, while
there were several instances of "eleventh hour
reversals" the fact remains when medical bills
are paid prior to a Commission decision of
compensability, the Neel Doctrine is
inapplicable. This applies to the physical therapy
charges, and prescriptions, which were paid prior to
this decision. (Emphasis added.)

This incorrect statement of law resulted in the errs identified as
appealable issues in Paragraphs 3b and 3c below.
b.

The Industrial Commission erred by finding Appellant was not
entitled to reimbursement for all medical charges, at the full
invoiced amount pursuant to Neel v. Western Construction, Inc.,
for medical treatment provided by Dr. Garg to Appellant after
November of 2013. (See Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Order.)

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2
(S:\1229-002 MillardT\Appeal\Notice of Appeal.wpd)

Industrial Commission
by finding Appellant was not
entitled
reimbursement for all medical
,n,r•c,r, amount
Neel V.
prescription
physical therapy
Paragraph 5 of the Order.)
The Appellant requests the reporter's transcript which has been previously
prepared by reporter Janet French of M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc. for
the hearing heid on October 24, 2014.
5.

Pursuant to Rule 28(c), I.A. R., the Appellant requests the following documents
be included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included
under Rule 28(b)(3), I.A.R:
a.

Hearing transcript for hearing on October 24, 2014;

b.

Claimant's Opening Brief

c.

Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief

d.

Claimant's Reply Brief

e.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation filed
on August 21, 2015 in this matter;

f.

Order filed on August 21, 2015 in this matter approving,
confirming, and adopting the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Recommendation also filed on August 21, 2015;

g.

Joint hearing exhibits 17, 20, 22-48, 50, 53, 54;

h.

Post-Hearing deposition transcript of David Beckstead, M.D.
taken on December 9, 2014;

i.

Post-Hearing deposition transcript ofVikas Garg, M.D., taken on
December 11, 2014;

j.

Post-Hearing deposition trancript of Paul Collins, M.D., taken on
January 15, 2015;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3
(S:11229-002 MillardT\Appeal\Notice of Appeal.wpd)

no

or

a.

A copy of this
of the Hearing;

of Appeal has

served on the

b.

There is no fee associated with obtaining the reporter's
transcript;

c.

The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid;

d.

The appellate filing fee has been paid; and

e.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2015.
RUCHTI & BECK LAW OFFICES

JAMES D. RUCHTI

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4
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a
as

Daniel Bowen
Bowen & Bailey
P.
Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701-1007
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U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
F simile:,r

MILLARD,

SUPREME COURT NO.

Claimant/Appellant,

rF,RTlFTr ATF 01? A PPF.A J,

V.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., Employer,
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH., Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
R. D. Maynard, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2007-008413

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation, filed August 21, 2015, and
Order, filed August 21, 2015

Attorney For Appellant:

James D. Ruchti
1950 E. Clark St. Ste. 200
Pocatello, ID 83201

Attorney For Respondents:

R. Daniel Bowen
PO Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701-1007

Appealed By:

Claimant/Appellant

Appealed Against:

Defendants/Respondents

Notice of Appeal Filed:

Fax-filed October 1, 2015

Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL (MILLARD)

1

October

APPEAL (MILLARD) - 2

2015

I,

Espinosa, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary

the Industrial

Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation; and Order; and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2007-008413 for
Thomas C. Millard.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission on this

5th

day of October, 2015.

(MILLARD)

I,

Jennifer

Komperud,

the

undersigned

Assistant

Commission

Secretary

of

the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct
copies of al! pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the i\.gency's Record

Supreme Court No. 43618 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by
the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015.

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (THOMAS MILLARD - 43618) - 1

Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 43618
NOTICE

V.

COMPLETION

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., Employer,
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts;
James d. Ruchti for the Appellant; and
R. Daniel Bowen for the Respondents.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellant:
JAMES D RUCHTI
275 S 5TH AVE SUITE 140
POCATELLO ID 83201
Attorney for Respondent(s):
R DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules,
all parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION (THOMAS MILLARD - 43618) - 1

event no

to

at

Idaho, this

or

are

day of

Assistant Commission Secretary

OF COMPLETION (THOMAS MILLARD - 43618) - 2

